Contextualizing the Pampangos (and Gagayano) soldiers in the Spanish fortress in Taiwan (1626-1642)/

Soldados Pampangos (y Cagayanos) de la fortaleza española de Taiwan, en su contexto

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This paper explores the case of the Pampanga nation, living near Manila, which proved especially helpful and cooperative with the Spanish colonial armies in the Philippines. Although Pampangos were praised for their bellicosity, we think that this is not so much due to their being a martial race, but rather that they entered into a process of military assimilation with the Spaniards that benefited both parties, receiving more training, compensation and satisfaction than other Filipino nations.

KEYWORDS: Pampangos; Cagayanos; Colonial Armies; Taiwan; Formosa; Philippines.

Este trabajo explora el caso particular de la nación Pampanga, situada cerca de Manila, y que resultó de gran ayuda en la expansión colonial española en las Filipinas. Aunque los pampangos eran ensalzados por su belicosidad, pensamos que ello se debe no a pertenecer a un tipo de «racia marcial», sino a un proceso de asimilación progresiva dentro de los ejércitos españoles que gue útil para ambas partes; bien porque recibieran mayor preparación militar, compensación y satisfacción que otras naciones filipinas.

PALABRAS CLAVE: Pampango; Cagayanos; Armadas coloniales; Taiwan; Formosa; Filipinas.
Oftentimes historians working on Spanish America neglect the Asian territory of the Philippines that in fact belonged to the same administrative realm. Colonial speaking, this archipelago was an extension of the Viceroyalty of Mexico, thus their history was very much intertwined. Both regions were very similar in administrative aspects, enjoying the same institutions, like the *Audiencia*, the system of *encomiendas*, etc. This relation and similarity was possible thanks to the yearly long trip of Acapulco galleons bound for Manila, departing in the spring and returning in summer through a five month trip.

Considering that the study of the peripheral colonial areas usually offers a different angle that helps to better understand the central ones. First, we would like to focus in this article on the recruitment of native warriors in the Philippines, a kind of administrative action whose procedure varied throughout the empire, nevertheless enjoyed great similarities. Second, we will see a particular case of this military life in the fortress of San Salvador in Isla Hermosa (Taiwan).

Most of the studies on the Spanish armies in the Americas focus especially on the 18th century, on the verge of colonial independence. On the contrary, studies on how they were formed and how they enrolled natives in the 16th and early 17th centuries were fewer until the recent publication of *Indian Conquistadors* (2007) that offered a new angle to the Spanish military strategies and a deep knowledge of the military role played by American natives in Spanish armies. This is a very important matter to clarify because, as Patricia Seed had mentioned, for the Spaniards «arriving at first in relatively small groups [and] not massive armies, skilled in acquiring alliances with natives or in deploying traditional hatreds for their own ends proved critical», and additionally might be helpful to understand later developments in the colonies.

The American and Far East background

When we look for details about enrollment of soldiers in Spanish America we find a trend throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, which is the increasing number of *Creole* soldiers and the decrease of the Spanish; but

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3 Seed, 2005, 139.
little information is given about natives serving with Spanish troops in the early decades, of which they should have been large numbers. And this should be true in Mexico as well as in the Philippines. The lack of specific information leads to what Matthew Restall called the «invisible warriors», claiming that «The search for native allies was one of the standard procedures or routines of Spanish conquest activity throughout the Americas».

In a fast overview we can recall that at the beginning of the conquest of Mexico Hernán Cortés made alliances with local tribes, like the Totonacs, the Campoallans, the Tlaxcalans, to fight with the Aztecs. After the conquest of Mexico he sent Pedro de Alvarado to invade Guatemala with 420 soldiers and 6,000 Cholula and Tlaxcala auxiliaries. These Tlaxcalans warriors were the best known because «for theirs was the first major polity to ally with Cortes in significant numbers». In the case of Peru, when Francisco Pizarro was in command of the territory, he used local warriors for further expeditions. For example, Almagro in his unsuccessful exploration of Chile was with 150 Spaniards, accompanied by near 10,000 yanaconas (servants of the Incas, or native auxiliaries of the Spaniards in Peru, that in Mexico were called naborías) to transport the weapons, clothing, and food. In the another expedition to Chile to fight the Araucans in 1539, Pedro de Valdivia went with 150 Spaniards and 3,000 yanaconas. Even in the Chilean war the Spanish adopted some native warfare methods.

Another example can be the one of the most ruthless conquistadors, Gonzalo Pizarro, who left Quito in March 1541 for an expedition across the Andes, with 220 soldiers and 4000 native servants. But the natives were not only enlisted for direct conquest but also to fight insurgents, as is well documented in the case of New Granada that we know thanks to the book of Vargas Machuca published in Madrid in 1599, which we can consider as a kind of manual of guerrilla warfare.

But more appealing than estimating the number of soldiers, is to know the conditions of the enrollment of these native soldiers, whether as servants or allies, in order to know how this might affect future relations. In the Philippines is easier to make these considerations because it is a smaller territory compared to the Americas. It seems that in this oriental colony

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5 Restall, 2003, 44.
7 Parker, 1988, 120.
8 Vargas Machuca, 2008.
some differences can be seen, first because the arrival of Legazpi in the archipelago was much later (1565), and second because the discussions on the just war and the Law of Nations were over, and the ideas of Vitoria on Indian rights were already predominant, consequently the relations with the Indians was not going to be the same as in the Americas. Additionally, the Philippine archipelago was not isolated, it enjoyed long relations with Chinese, with other Southeast Asian realms and even with the Muslims that arrived to the area a little earlier than the Spaniards. Other reasons that may explain the difference between Mexico and Manila might be that the Spaniard soldiers in America, while scarce, were proportionally more numerous than the few Spaniards living in the Philippines, or better to say in Manila, where they concentrated. Yet, the similarities still outweigh the differences.

Another important factor to consider is the Dutch rivalry with Spain. As is well-known, since the beginning of the 16th century both countries shared the same monarch but a half century later Holland initiated a process of independence that derived in a long war. This war had three different fronts, Europe, America (particularly Brazil) and the Pacific Ocean, from the Spice Islands (presently in Eastern Indonesia) to Japan. The Dutch showed up for the first time in the East in 1599 and later in 1601, 1603 and 1604 tried to take over the Portuguese colony of Macao. In 1602 they founded the powerful Commercial Company of the East Indies (VOC), a self-governing body with military might, and in 1605 they conquered the Portuguese settlement of Ambon. No wonder, the Spanish governor in The Philippines Pedro Bravo de Acuña wrote in 1605 to the king: «I think that to drive the [Dutch] enemy from the Moluccas and from the islands of Banda, will be of great advantage to our affairs in Flanders, since the rebels of Holland and Zeeland harvest the products of these islands, and draw to them great wealth, by means of which they carry on war and become rich».10

9 An analysis of the types of political organization prevalent among the natives of Southeast Asia may throw light on the interaction of Spaniards with the Pampangos. Shinzo Hayase in his analysis of the maritime Southeast Asian world regarding the aspect of «kingdom/nation-making» defines four types: (1) the kingdoms formed by Indianization, (2) the kingdoms formed by Islamization and the influence of the «age of commerce», (3) the colonial states formed by Christianization, and (4) the chiefdoms which did not form a kingdom (see Hayase, 2007, 16-17). We think that the Pampangos were a mixture of everything, since they counted initially with a clear political organization, and at the same time they were affected by Christianization, and finally kept their own social model under a theoretical Spanish vassalage.

10 Schurz, 1989, 283.
This rivalry, which lasted for half a century, ranged from small skirmishes to major battles, first in the Moluccas, later in the Philippines, and even in farther places like Taiwan. Earlier, in 1616, in the Moluccas, Manila Governor General Juan de Silva launched an attempt to give Dutch power a deathblow, but it was a failure and the Dutch continued extending their power. Ten years later, Spanish troops were deployed to Taiwan (1626), to overthrow the Dutch, to protect the China-Manila trade from Dutch interference and to assure a safe and easy passage to China and Japan. The two powers occupied two different areas in Taiwan until 1642, when the Dutch finally ousted the Spaniards from the island. Consequently we are going to present a particular case of enrollment in Spanish colonial armies, the one of the Pampangos in the Philippines and particularly in Taiwan, as an Eastern model that may serve to establish comparisons with Spanish armies in America as well with Dutch armies in the East.

The progressive presence of Pampango soldiers in Spanish armies

Filipino soldiers were a key factor in Spanish armies because they usually outnumbered the Spanish soldiers. Here we will look into this matter in two ways. First, the reasons behind the progressive enlistment of Filipino soldiers —especially the Pampangos (and also the Cagayanos for the case of Taiwan)—, not only in the conquest of Luzon at the end of the 16th century, but especially during the Dutch War Period (1600-1648). Second, we will look into the particular case of Filipino soldiers in Taiwan (i.e., their enlistment, length of service, salaries, names, etc.), to see if this particular case of native soldiers fighting outside their land, can help us better understand the readiness of the Pampangos and the Cagayanos to join the Spanish armed forces.

It is impossible to accurately quantify the number of Filipino and Spanish soldiers involved in military activities, but we have tried to make some estimation from the classical historical sources not only in the period of the first settlement (1575-1600) but also during the Dutch Wars (1600-1648). But, to contextualize the enrolment of the Filipino soldiers during the years of the Spanish presence in Taiwan (1626-1642), let us see first the following table:

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11 Borao, 2009, 7-30.
# TABLE 1

**ESTIMATED NUMBER OF SPANISH AND FILIPINO SOLDIERS IN THE EXPEDITIONARY TROOPS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Expedition</th>
<th>Spaniards</th>
<th>Filipinos</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1575</td>
<td>Expedition against Limahong (Pangasinan)</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>2500</td>
<td>2750</td>
<td>Molina I, 78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1578</td>
<td>First expedition to Borneo</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>BRPI XV, 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1581</td>
<td>First expedition against Taysufu (Cagayan)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td></td>
<td>Malumbres, 28-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1581</td>
<td>Second expedition to Borneo</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td></td>
<td>BRPI XV, 57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1582</td>
<td>First expedition to the Moluccas</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>Malumbres, 28-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1589</td>
<td>Second expedition to the Moluccas</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td></td>
<td>Malumbres, 28-29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1591</td>
<td>Second expedition to Cagayan-Tuy</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1400</td>
<td>1480</td>
<td>BRPI XIV, 282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1591</td>
<td>Expedition against the Zambales</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,120</td>
<td>BRPI VIII, 214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1593</td>
<td>Third expedition to the Moluccas</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td></td>
<td>BRPI XV, 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1596</td>
<td>First expedition to Cambodia (Gallinato)</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>some</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aduarte I, 316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1598</td>
<td>Second expedition to Cambodia (Dasmarinas)</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td></td>
<td>BRPI XV, 54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1602</td>
<td>First expedition to Joló</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>Molina I, 102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1603</td>
<td>First repression of the Sangleys</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>2,720</td>
<td>BRPI XIV, 131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1606</td>
<td>Fourth expedition to the Moluccas</td>
<td>1423</td>
<td>1,672</td>
<td>3,095</td>
<td>Molina I, 104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1609</td>
<td>Ofensive to Caraga (De Silva)</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>NP VI, lxxx-lxxxv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1616</td>
<td>Expedition to Sincapora (De Silva)</td>
<td>2,000</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>NP VI, cccxxvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1617</td>
<td>The battle of Playa Honda (Manila)</td>
<td>1,736</td>
<td>1,593</td>
<td>3,329</td>
<td>NP VI, cccxcvii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1626</td>
<td>Expedition to Taiwan (advance fleet)</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>SIT, 146-149</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1626</td>
<td>Expedition to Taiwan (entire fleet)</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1,200</td>
<td>1,700</td>
<td>SIT, 88-90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1627</td>
<td>Second expedition to Taiwan</td>
<td>731</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>1,011</td>
<td>SIT, 100-101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1636</td>
<td>Second expedition to Joló</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>NP IX, xxxiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1637</td>
<td>First expedition against Cudarat (Mindanao)</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>3,000</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>NP IX, xxxiv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1638</td>
<td>Second punitive expedition to Mindanao-Joló</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>NP VIII-b, cxxxi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1639</td>
<td>Second repression of the Sangleys</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>4,200</td>
<td>NP IX, xxxvi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1644</td>
<td>Defense of Abucay against the Dutch</td>
<td>No data</td>
<td>600</td>
<td></td>
<td>Fernández, 146</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From archival sources *BRPI,¹³ NP,¹¹ SIT¹¹* and from secondary literature.¹⁵

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12 Blair & Robertson, 1905.
13 Francisco Navas del Valle; Pablo Pastells. *Catálogo de los documentos relativos a las Islas Filipinas existentes en el Archivo de Indias de Sevilla. Precedido de una Historia General de Filipinas,* (Barcelona: Compañía General de Tabacos de Filipinas, 8 vols.: 1928-1935).
14 Borao, 2001-2002 (later cited as SIT).
15 Malumbres, 1918; Molina, 1984; Morga, 1609; and Aduarte, 1963, [1640]
This table allows us to ascertain that over 30,000-40,000 Filipino soldiers were mobilized over a period of almost 65 years (1575-1640). If we consider the most conservative number of 30,000, the table reveals the ratio of Spanish soldiers to Filipinos was, in the 16th century, 1:5.

Early on in 17th century, when the Dutch stepped into the South East Asian seas threatening Portuguese and Spanish, the ratio shifted, and the number of Spaniards was sometimes almost equal to the number of Filipinos. Finally, in the 1630s, the Filipinos again outnumbered the Spaniards. At the same time we must say that under the label of Spaniards we must place other nationals, especially people from Nueva España (Mexico), but we lack information to establish a clear proportion.

**Early recruitment of Pampango soldiers (16th century)**

As we have discussed this topic in an earlier work, it is very noticeable that the majority of the native Filipino soldiers come from the Pampanga region, a well populated area near Manila. These warriors enrolled in the Spanish armies along the fourth quarter of the 16th century in four specific moments. First in the expedition against the well-known Chinese pirate Limahong, in Pangasinan (1571) and the less-known Japanese pirate Taifusu in the north coast of Luzon (1581), who, after being defeated, fled to Formosa and Japan.17

The second moment of close cooperation with native armies was during the civil Borneo’s wars, first in 157818 and second in 1581,19 and in the Moluccas’ war. This second expedition was organized by the then-newly installed Governor Ronquillo de Peñalosa, who had brought with him from Mexico a motley group of 600 Spanish soldiers and civilians, which in context reminds the *escalonamiento* system of recruiting Spanish soldiers in America.20 On the other hand the Moluccas’ expeditions, the one in 1589

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16 Borao, 2008, 74-93.
17 Malumbres, 1918, 28-29.
18 Molina, 1984, I, 76.
20 Some scholars argue that at the beginning of the conquest the first method of recruitment in America was the *acarreo* (individual muster, like Hernan Cortés), later the *escalonamiento* (staggered groups, like Pedro de Heredia), followed by a mixed system (Francisco Pizarro). See Marchena Fernández and Gómez Pérez, 1985, 127-215.
(under Santiago de Vera) and that of 1593 (under Gómez Pérez de Dasmariñas), might have firmed up the Spanish government’s confidence in the fidelity of the Pampangos, and some of their leaders were rewarded in those years with royal lands and properties. We should also include now the expedition sent to the kingdom of Cambodia, to assist king Paramaraja in his wars against the kingdom of Siam, where Spaniards went there in 1596 and in 1598 assisted by Pampangos.21

The third important moment of this early military relation was during the exploration of Cagayan-Tuy and the war against the Zambales in 1591. Luis Pérez Dasmariñas was sent there «with 70 or 80 Spanish soldiers, and many Indian chiefs of Pampanga, who were going with their arms and men to serve with Don Luis, to explore the province now called Tuy. The chief took more than one thousand four hundred Indian bearers.» (BRPI XIV, 282). That same year, Governor Gómez Pérez Dasmariñas declared war against the Zambales, a tribe that inhabited the mountainous area close to Pampanga, and in which Pampango soldiers were recruited, motivated to the occasion of revenge old unsettled disputed with their old time enemies.22

Finally, after the turn of the century the expedition against the Muslin sultanate of Jolo happened in 1602, led by Gallinato, «who was sent with 400 men, half of them Filipinos».23 But most important was the subsequent Pampango help suppressing the Sangley uprising in Manila (1603)24 with 1000 warriors (BRPI XIV, 128-132).

Recruitment during the expeditions against the Dutch

The expeditions against the Dutch that took place in the first half of the 17th century —in the context of the so-called Dutch Wars (1600-1648)— mark a new phase in the enlistment of Filipino soldiers in the Spanish armed forces, characterized by a more professional military war-

22 Restall, 2003, 50.
24 For details about this uprising see Borao, 1998, 22-39.
fare, that they «have learned in the presidiums of Terrenalte, Zamboanga, Joló, Caraga and other parts». To counterattack the Dutch encroachment, the Spaniards sent three offensives outside the archipelago against the Dutch. The first one in 1606 (Moluccas) —where 1,423 Spaniards and 960 Pampangos and Tagalogs were involved. The second one was in 1616 organized by Juan de Silva attempting to defeat the Dutch in Java, in collaboration with the Viceroy of Portugal in Goa. De Silva left Manila in January 1616 with a powerful fleet manned by 2,000 Spaniards and 2,500 Filipinos and 500 Japanese. The third one was in 1626 to Isla Hermosa (Taiwan) to protect Manila from the seasonal blockades that Dutch galleons. In this third reaction of 1626 the Spaniards occupied Quelang, a prominent bay in the north of Taiwan, where they started installing the fortress ad «city» of San Salvador, something that we will consider more lengthily later.

In the Far East the Spaniards hardly engaged in hostilities with the Dutch during the 1630s, and they focused more on the problems of Mindanao and Joló. The Governor Corcuera started by sending 300 Spaniards and 3,000 natives (NP IX, xxxiv) on a punitive mission against the Muslim chiefs in Mindanao. Soon after, another mission in Joló (1637) saw Corcuera transporting on 11 junks three military companies —one made up of 150 Spaniards, the second, which consisted of 100 Spaniards, under the command of Captain Lorenzo de Orella, and the third, which enlisted 100 Pampangos (NP VIII-b, liii). When they reached Zamboanga, they enlisted 100 Spaniards and 50 Pampangos more. Later, Juan Nicolás arrived with 80 Spaniards and 20 Pampangos. A new mission to Joló took place in 1638, consisting of 80 boats, had 600 Spaniards and 1,000 natives, 500 of whom were adventurers and galley slaves (NP VIII-b, cxxxiii). We end this fast account about the participation of native soldiers in the Spanish armed forces during the term of Governor Corcuera, ascertaining that 4,000 native warriors were involved in quelling the Sangley uprising of 1639. Of these, Corcuera gave a ratio of 200 Spaniards to 1,000 Pampangos and 3,000 Tagalogs (NP IX, xxxvi).

25 Gaspar de San Agustín, 1890, [1698], 571.
26 Bartolomé Leonardo de Argensola, 1891, [1609], 354-393.
27 See the whole affair in NP VI, cccxxvi and in BRPI XVII, 251-280.
28 For an account of the blockades to Manila and the Spanish counteroffensives, see Borao, 2005, 226-247.
It should not come as a surprise that the Augustinian Medina manifested in 1630 his wonder of still seeing males in Pampanga: «This place had had a great drainage of soldiers, that I am impressed how there are still males. Certainly the governors send soldiers [from Pampanga] to Moluccas, Cebú, Otón and Cagayan, places that have fortresses kept by...
Pampangos, who even work more than the same Spaniards, do not receive salary, have scarce food and receive bad dealings».29

**Pampangos within the fortresses**

We have so far tracked the movements of some soldiers assigned to specific missions, but another aspect to look into is to study every fortress and the number of native soldiers enlisted to serve in each one. For the moment, a thorough task of checking the five or six main garrisons in the Philippines exceeds our possibilities. Nevertheless we can analyze the memorial that the Procurator of the Philippine Islands in the court of Madrid, Juan Grau de Monfalcón, presented to the King in 1637 describing the situation of the island two years earlier (SIT, 232-234). It helps us to visualize the presence of the Pampango soldiers who were assigned all throughout the islands.

The infantry soldiers were divided into two groups. The first group was involved in «land combat» (section 51); it was assigned to the Manila encampment, which besides Fort Santiago in Intramuros, was extended to the fortresses of Cebú, Otón, Cagayan, and Isla Hermosa [Taiwan].

According to Monfalcón’s report, these satellite fortresses of the «Manila camp» had a company of 140 Pampango soldiers with their respective officers. The second group was assigned to Moluccas (section 52 of the report), where seven Spanish companies (570 soldiers) and two Pampango companies (200 soldiers) comprised the infantry of the «war of Maluco».

At this point, it would be interesting to look at their supposedly monthly wages to see the difference between Spanish and Filipino soldiers (SIT, 336-342).

A captain should earn 24 pesos, a second lieutenant, 16 pesos, a sergeant, eight pesos, and a soldier, four pesos. It is possible that—at least in theory—this was the salary also for native soldiers designated by the Council of the Indies; however, the wages that each soldier actually received in Isla Hermosa in 1641 were much lower: four reals per soldier and one peso per officer. It seems that —excluding mismanagement— the said wages were «stretched» to expand the number of soldiers in the fortresses.

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29 Juan de Medina, 1893, [1630], 127.
Besides the Pampangos and Cagayanos, we have to consider the entire branch of the navy, officially called «the branch of the navy and of weaponry services» that surely included native personnel.

The same memorial states that there were six galleys, two of which were assigned to Manila, two to Isla Hermosa and two to Terrenate, and that these were manned by 1,080 penal workers (180 per ship) who probably corresponded to half of the 2,200 natives working in the said branch.

It seems difficult to recruit these personnel in Manila, and the most recurrent possibility was to do it along the way. For example, in one of his reports (1632), the Dominican Esquivel recommended a solution to gather more workers in the port of Bangui, such as artisans and blacksmiths, a port which lies along the route to Isla Hermosa.

«[These men] are also needed to row the vessels. Some 30 of them have been recalled. This year [of 1632], native blacksmiths, carbon makers, iron workers, box makers and gastadores are urgently needed to replenish [the work force] in the galleys. They can be recruited from the provinces of Bulacan, Pangasinan, Ilocos, and Cagayan. They may assemble at the Bangui port, where they can board two sampans that ply the route from there to Isla Hermosa, as the distance between the two points is very short.» (SIT, 195)

The soldiers of Isla Hermosa (Taiwan)

It is difficult to reconstruct exactly the number of Filipinos who had gone to Taiwan during the Spaniards’ occupation of the island (1626-1642) because detailed statistics are not available and the dispersed reports sometimes are conflicting. Still, we are going to make an approximation in order to have a glimpse of the vicissitudes in manning the garrisons that they experienced during their 16-year stay in the island.

The initial deployment of soldiers in 1626 arriving in Taiwan aboard the conquest fleet landed in two phases (SIT, 26-27). The first was an advance party made up of two galleys and some junks that transported 100 Spaniards and 200 «blacks and Pampangos» in May. This advance party was followed by the entire fleet of 500 Spaniards and some 1,100 to 1,200 Pampangos in September (SIT, 90). Dutch sources make indirect mention of the size of the fleets; still some other indications in the Spanish sources seem to confirm this. According to the Dutch sources, this fleet experienced huge problems during the voyage. The majority died; the rest
perished in the Spanish post in Taiwan. As the Spanish sources say, «they were afflicted by the land».

A second important attempt of deployment of soldiers took place in 1627. The loss of the previous armada and the urgency to dislodge the Dutch from their newly established post in Tayouan led Governor Niño de Tavora to send a third fleet. We have more precise figures from this second voyage: 731 soldiers comprised the Spanish infantry, while 280 made up the Pampango infantry, plus other ones, totaling 2015 men. This second fleet met the same ill fate as the former. It departed late and was assailed by a typhoon. Only the *patache* Rosario reached its destination. On it were 60 Spanish and 25 Pampango infantrymen (SIT, 101). From then on, no massive deployment of soldiers was ever again attempted.

The number of soldiers in the early expeditions of conquest of Northern Taiwan was much higher than that which was sent later to defend the post. The data for the deployment of troops can be represented in the following table:

**TABLE 2**

**MILITARY PERSONNEL IN THE SPANISH FORTS OF ISLA HERMOSA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Soldiers</th>
<th>1626</th>
<th>1629</th>
<th>1631</th>
<th>1633</th>
<th>1637</th>
<th>1639</th>
<th>1640</th>
<th>1641</th>
<th>1642</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spaniards</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pampangos</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cagayanos</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>93</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIT, 147 SIT, 439 SIT, 147 SIT, 211 SIT, 500 SIT, 314 SIT, 324 SIT, 336 SIT, 397

We can assume that each time a relief ship was sent (since 1632, the regularity was twice a year) the troops experienced the arrival of incoming reinforcements and the departure of men who had to go back to Manila because they were discharged or sick or had other like reasons. Obviously, soldiers were not expected to return to Manila soon, at least not during the first few years after the conquest, which proved to be very hard. By 1632, even if the situation must have been consolidated, the first official reports of the first desertions by Filipino soldiers arose, as we will see later. In the

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30 Dutch sources estimate for that year 250 Spanish soldiers and 350 Pampangos (*SIT*, 147), a data that—compared with the general trend—is obviously an exaggeration.
final years of the Spanish occupation of Northern Taiwan it was hard to recruit new soldiers and these men were recruited despite their lack of qualifications and even if they had no previous training.

Since the records come from indirect sources, sometimes they are conflicting. This is the case of the Dutch report of 1633, based in the declaration of some deserters, who declared that the Quelang camp housed 100 Spaniards and 20 Pampangos, as well as 80-90 slaves who worked on the fortress construction. Seeing in perspective, these 20 Pampangos represent a very small figure. Regarding the Cagayanos, a letter from Corcuera in 1635 mentions that a junk on its way to Manila bore an order to take in 50 native soldiers when it passed Cagayan (SIT, 229), but still, the Pampangos formed the majority of native expeditionary troops who manned the fortresses in the first half of the period. This trend was reversed in 1637, when the Cagayanos increased in number. In a special council that was convoked in Manila that year to study the possibility of dismantling the fortresses in Isla Hermosa, Governor Corcuera already bemoaned the difficulty of sending relief to those fortresses and yet commended the Pampangos’ reliability in bearing the job:

«And as for the few Spaniards whom the Viceroys of Mexico send every year, many die because of the bad climate in this land, and so the Governor is obliged and practically forced to raise up companies from among the people of Pampanga in order to help Terrenate, Zamboanga, Caraga, Cebu, Oton, Nueva Segovia, the said Isla Hermosa and, lastly, this city which has three companies of 300 men. The Spaniards that remain, with all their illnesses, are so few that they cannot assume all the vacant posts and attend to the tasks of numerous sentinels.» (SIT, 263)

As regards the trend of replacements and discharges during the Spaniards’ last two years in Taiwan, we have two specific lists of soldiers. One contains the names of those who were recalled on 24 May 1640, when Governor Cristóbal Márquez went back, bringing with him 33 Spanish soldiers, 19 Pampangos, and seven Cagayanos (SIT, 314-315). Portillo, the new governor of Taiwan, resented the move because «the Pampangos who got sent back to Manila were needed in this fort [San Salvador]. And since this government does not have them, it will be necessary that the crown pay for the wages of the Sangley hired to do these jobs» (SIT, 318). On the other hand, the reason behind the Cagayanos’ return was clearer. Their leader, Captain Angel Cabul, was an old timer with bad habits. He had forsaken his duties to the company and was exerting bad influence on the seamen.
Portillo, for his part, realized that Corcuera was neglecting him in Isla Hermosa, having decided to focus all his resources on the wars in Joló. In a letter dated March 1642, Portillo wrote to Corcuera to air his complaint more plainly, pointing out that the latest reinforcements were of little or no use to him:

«The men from Cagayan who were brought in by Sergeant Major Cristóbal Márquez and those whom I myself brought are a useless lot who are only good at eating up the rice. I did not send them because they are an extra burden. Moreover, these men are not the ones who have proven their worth to Your Lordship, but rather those who wanted to be sent from Cagayan—all aged, some of who are 80 years old.» (SIT, 373)

For reconstructing the evolution of the troops before the final battle against the Dutch we have made some calculations to fill up the previous table. In 1640, 24 «useless» Cagayanos arrived and Portillo included them in his new status report (SIT, 324). If we subtract these from the number of men who had left the island with Cristóbal Márquez, we can have a relative picture of the situation in that camp in 1639. We also have a more complete list with names and family names of the soldiers who manned the fortress in 1641. These figures also confirm what we had said about the increasing number of Cagayan soldiers in Isla Hermosa. Several reasons must be behind this change, first the fact that Pampango soldiers were too much in demand, also the fact that in 1639 the Spaniards had to face a sangley uprising near Manila, and it was not wise to disperse the close Pampagan allies. Finally, the fact that Cagayan—located in northern Luzon, in the last stage before the long lap to Taiwan—started to be considered as new source of recruitment.

We must say that the figures of table 2 only speak about soldiers, Spaniards, Pampangos and Cagayanos, averaging of 250 to 300. The detailed Dutch accounts of the prisoners made in 1642 after the conquest, presents a more exact composition of the population of San Salvador, because it includes civilians. Besides the number of 268 soldiers they offer, the data mention 42 women (most of them must have been local women married with soldiers), 18 children, 32 slaves, 55 servants of soldiers and 2 priests with 29 servants, reaching a total population of 400 people.31

Other aspect to consider is the desertion of the soldiers that cannot be repatriated in the regular movement of troops from Manila to San Salvador depending on the two annual relief ships from Manila. Existing documents

31 Borao, 2009, 122-123.
about these ships contain more data about cargo than about passengers. After three fleets sent in 1626 and 1627, that in fact did not reach their destination, only relief ships, called socorro, were sent out twice a year. Most of them accomplished their mission successfully carrying all the provisions, few got sunk and only one complaint was registered, referring to the relief ship that arrived in May 1631, which consisted of two junks carrying a meager cargo.

We do not know if soldier reinforcements arrived on those first relief ships. Still, it seems possible that some native soldiers (particularly Pampangos) that had arrived earlier in Taiwan had not stayed long enough serving in the island, as to think they were entitled to return to Philippines. Probably, the paltry cargo of the said relief ship of 1631 might have triggered the first documented desertion by six Filipino Pampango soldiers. At the end of June 1631, a group of deserters took a small vessel in Tamsui and fled south, either to the Philippines or to the Dutch camp (SIT, 147-148). Whatever their real motives were, all six showed up at the Dutch factory in Tayouan on 30 June, where they gave themselves up and were interrogated about the reasons for their desertion.

Two of these men, Domingo de Cavatda and Alonche de Toulacque (their names are spelled this way in the Dutch transcription), before going to Taiwan lived close to Manila, meaning that probably they were Tagalogs. They declared that seven years earlier, they were recruited by the Spaniards to embark on a voyage. They formed a crew of Pampangos and black men who departed for Quelang on a fleet composed of a frigate, two galleys, and nine junks. From the time they arrived in Quelang until they escaped, they were employed as construction workers for the Spanish fortifications. They added that for the past two years, «they received no pay for their labor, but rather beatings and ill treatment.» The other four deserters who were with Cavatda and Toulacque and others who had arrived two years earlier also made their statements. The general picture was that the Spanish detachment being described was composed of 100 Spaniards and 25-30 Pampangos who were also employed as construction workers for the fortress.

33 However, what is strange about these figures is that the other data that the Dutch gathered earlier (SIT, 147) indicated that there were about 200-300 Spaniards and 300-400 Pampangos. This information came from the son of Captain China, one of the merchant-pirates who serviced the Dutch, who was forced to dock in Quelang because of a storm. He was detained by the Spaniards from early February to mid-March 1631. Soon after, the pirate reached Tayouan and gave a report whose content, we believe, is exaggerated.
According to Esquivel the reason for the desertion was the work conditions —the tasks given them, the way they were treated, and the sorry state of their families— which were more like those of a slave. Esquivel goes on to say that in 1632, a new group of 17 deserters was discovered and that they, too, were ready to take a sampan and flee to the north of the Philippines. Esquivel also writes of the real and desperate condition of those soldiers and explains the reasons for it. Many of them were recruited on false promises: they were told that they were to be away for just two months. Others were forced to row in the galleys as punishment for their crimes. However, even after they had completed their term, they were retained as penal workers. Here is the complete Esquivel’s narrative:

«Moreover, the native men [from the Philippines] would be spared of vexation every time they are taken from their families to serve as soldiers to guard another land and who serve here as slaves since the time this place was occupied (now, seven years). They abandon their children, wives and their lands, and the next time they see them, many out of hunger would have sold themselves into slavery. These present conditions have made them so desperate that two or three years ago, some went over to the fort of the Dutch —five Cagayanos and a panday. Recently, it was ascertained that at most 17 of them were reported to have escaped. Taking with them some firearms and a Sangley sampan that would come to the port; they escaped in it to the Babuyan Islands. In the same period, one was hanged for desertion. He had escaped to the mountains of Quimaurri in uniform and with spear. I also have heard others cursing so much, and it is not surprising that they complain. They live in despair and anger because they are neither relieved from their posts nor sent back to their hometowns. Some of them were deceived into thinking that they would be there only for two months. Others came in galleys as to serve for their crimes but after their term is over, they are kept there as construction workers because they do not send others from Manila. In order to avoid these troubles at the least expense, what may be done is to employ 100 or 200 Sangley laborers in both forts who can return to their lands, in the place of these native workers.» (SIT, 171)

Taiwan’s Governor Palomino also recounts another desertion in 1638. Three Cagayanos fled to the «enemy zone», which is probably the Tamchui area. However, Palomino adds that they have begun to negotiate with them so that they would return (SIT, 289). The reasons for this desertion are not clear. In the same report that Palomino submitted to Corcuera, he declared that that year’ natural conditions have been kind to them as regards the deaths of soldiers. Only four had died: one Spanish soldier who was already ill, a Pampango that Palomino brought with him in his voyage to Isla Hermosa, and a boatswain and a Creole slave who were attacked by
their native enemies on the road to Tamchui. Palomino further states in the same report that he was sending back to Manila «20 soldiers, some of whom are married, and the aide-de-camp Ginés de Rosas, who for this year and as always, has fulfilled his duties very well. I also send some men from Cagayan and four from Pampanga who are disabled» (SIT, 292). It is difficult to know if this was a general standard procedure for every relief ship dispatched to Taiwan; or if the return of the soldiers was part of Corcuera’s master plan implemented in 1637, to progressively dismantle the said forces in Taiwan.

Other case of Cagayanos’ desertion was registered upon the conquest of the Spanish fortress of Quelang by the Dutch. They made three groups of captives. First, the Spaniards were to be sent to Batavia and from there to be granted free passage either to Manila or to Spain. Secondly was the group of 62 Pampangans who were to be kept with them in Batavia, and eventually – if they proved loyal to the VOC interest– would join the attacks on Manila. Finally, there were 93 soldiers from Cagayan, who were also enslaved and most of them were put under the direct disposition of Dutch commander Lamotius, who brought them to Tamchui (the Dutch center of operations in northern Taiwan). When Lamotius left Tamchui and headed towards the Tayouan (the Dutch factory in Taiwan), 6 Cagayan slaves escaped, looking for shelter among the natives.34

This other case of desertion of Cagayanos magnified more the contrast that no Pampango desertions were registered in Taiwan, a situation that also Gaspar of San Agustin stated for the case of Moluccas: «It must be stated something strange: it is unknown that the Pampangas in the Moluccas, even if they receive bad dealings [from the Spaniards], have passed to the Dutch… on the contrary, among the other natives there are many that have escaped».35

The battle of San Salvador (19-25 August 1642)

This final armed conflict between the Spanish and Dutch colonial powers saw the defeat and the definitive withdrawal of the Spaniards from...
Isla Hermosa. The development of the battle was quite simple. Portillo, Taiwan’s Spanish governor at that time, hardly put up a resistance. Thus what could have been a month-long siege turned out to be a weeklong skirmish. The recruitment and involvement of native Filipinos in this battle followed the same pattern, number, and ratio of Spaniards to Filipinos, as that of previous military actions. In the initial resistance, Portillo deployed a company of around 80 men, mostly Spaniards, and two groups of Cagayanos and Pampangos, who marched under their own banner, showing that they enjoyed certain «autonomy» within the army.

It is likewise interesting to see how the ratio of Spanish soldiers to natives was maintained. When the said company retreated without an engagement with Dutch forces, they left behind a small party of soldiers to deal with the Dutch landing. This group again mirrored the previous ratio of Spaniards to Cagayanos to Pampangos. When their number could no longer hold up against the pressure of the Dutch, they retreated to the small fortress *La Mira*, and soon later to *La Retirada*. There they joined the soldiers of Second Lieutenant Aréchaga, who where distributed again proportionally. During five days they put resistance against the Dutch until they could not hold that position anymore.

When Governor General Corcuera and his successor initiated an investigation to find out who was indeed responsible for the fall of Isla Hermosa, not one native was cross-examined. Only Spanish soldiers and officers underwent cross-examination, probably because the Dutch kept the Pampangos in Batavia with the intention of incorporating them to their own army against the Spaniards. We may assume that this was not only because of the Filipinos’ military skills, but also because these men were very familiar with the land that the Dutch planned to conquer next. The Dutch thought that using native collaborators would help conquer Manila more quickly by exerting effective and unrelenting pressure on the city.

In relation with this we can cite the so-called tragedy of Abucay (1647), that happened after the last attempt launched by the Dutch to conquer Cavite. After they failed, they retreated to Bataan, which is on the opposite side of Manila Bay. They reached Abucay, the capital of Bataan, which was under the protection of 600 Pampango soldiers under the command of Cabrera, the mayor of Pampanga. Cabrera had poor military know-how. This was why instead of commanding an open engagement against the Dutch landing —which the Pampangos urged him to do— he did not even try to fight but instead shut all the men up within the puny
walls of a church. Cabrera was taken as hostage, and the rest of Pampangos were shot in cold blood. 36 When the Dutch could not collect any form of ransom and were in turn beset by the Spanish troops from Manila, they left the place. This coincided with the ending of hostilities between Spain and Holland in 1648 with the signing of the Treaty of Munster.

Conclusion

We have mentioned five reasons by which Pampangos were progressively involved in Spanish armies and becoming the native elite troops of the Spaniards in the Philippines. These were: (1) the defence of their territory during the Limahong invasion; (2), the acquisition of an overseas experience and the receiving of cabalitas-encomiendas during the Borneo and Moluccas wars; (3) the revenge and reward against close enemies during the Zambales war; (4) the booty and honour during the Sangley uprising; (5) their professionalization of their military skills during the Dutch wars.

But now, after explaining the other kind of encomiendas they were able to get in the 17th century, we can consider the last reason why the Pampango aristocracy might have help in recruiting soldiers to fill up the Spanish armies during the last years of the Dutch wars: (6) the expectation of acquiring a formal encomienda, in the same category as the Spaniards, help them to consolidate their status resembling somehow the Spanish aristocracy.

Precisely, among the known ten applications, the first ones — according to Santiago — were submitted during these years of fighting the Dutch by Pampangos: Don Ventura de Mendoza, who was half Tagalog (ca. 1620), Don Diego de Marácot (1623), Don Juan de Vera (1624) and Don Nicolás de los Ángeles (1631).

We must say that the good relation between Spaniards and Pampangos was probably based in a major hispanization — that we can observe, for example, comparing the surnames of the Pampangos and Cagayanos soldiers’ lists (SIT, 339-342) — and in the fact that the Spaniards granted the Pampangos greater independence by delegating power to the local Datus. 37

36 Fernández, 1958, 146-147.
37 Larkin, 1972, 33.
but this did not prevent that their allegiance to the colonial government was entirely unconditional, since revolts happened, as well as with the Cagayanos.

Finally, shifting again our view from the Philippines to the Americas, we perceive that there were more similarities than differences between both regions in the recruitment of soldiers than expected. Probably the most outstanding similarity is that Spaniards dealt with Pampangos, Cagayanos and Tagalogs as member of different nations and accepted them with their own military units as allies, accordingly in America natives appear also to be considered—especially in the early stage of the conquest—as different people among themselves. And the most interesting thing is that, even if sometimes they were treated only as auxiliary troops under the direct command of the Spaniards, in both places most of the time they formed they own units. We have explained that clearly in the case of the Pampangos and Cagayanos in the Taiwan case, and Restall tells us the same for the Mayas when he says:

«Nor was there a sense of Maya ethnic solidarity in the sixteenth century. In time, Mayas from the Calkini region and other parts of Yucatan would accompany Spaniards into unconquered regions as the peninsula as porters, warriors, and auxiliaries of various kinds. Companies of archers were under permanent commission in the Maya towns of Tekax and Oskutzcab, regularly called upon to man or assist in raids into the unconquered south of the colony of Yucatan. As late as 1690s Mayas from over a dozen Yucatec towns—organized in companies under their own officers—fought other Mayas in support of Spanish Conquest endeavours in the Petén region».

As for the differences in both cases one can be especially mentioned, that in the Philippines there is more uniformity in the way Spaniards treated the native warriors, maybe because the Pampangos was the sole nation especially involved. If we take the division in four groups of «Indian conquerors» in Mesoamerica made by Susan Schroeder, we can see how she

38 In Pampanga there was a first revolt in 1585. The rebels tried to massacre the encomenderos, because they have committed abuses. But the plot was betrayed by a native woman, wife of a Spanish soldier. The second happened in 1645, also connected with the collection of tributes, and another in 1660. See Ancheta, 1972, 165-179.
39 In Cagayan and Ilocos Norte the first revolts related with the payment of tributes were in 1589. Later, due to the cruelty of the major Marcos Zapata, some rebellions happened in 1625-27 and in 1639. In Ilocos Norte, there was another rebellion in 1788 motivated by the dissatisfaction over the wine and tobacco monopolies. Ancheta, 1972, 168.
40 Restall, 2003, 50.
41 Schroeder, 2007, 15.
mentions first those who were forced, often in chains, to accompany Spaniards to the battle; second those who volunteered to assist a conqueror or viceroy and then returned home, third are the groups who departed as warriors, conquerors, and auxiliaries and became permanent colonists; and finally the groups who eschewed warfare but went to colonize and by their good example lure native in unsettled areas to follow their ways. In the case of the Philippines the cases of Pampangos and Cagayanos refer mainly to the second group, though eventually some people were forced like in the first model (sometimes the Cagayanos on their way to Taiwan), but on the contrary the third and four models are probably inexistent in the Philippines.

Finally, we hope that a better knowledge of early native enrolment in America will complement what the classical outstanding studies have offered to us focusing mainly on Spanish soldiers. In the same way these studies will also be enriched by observing other actions (like native recruitment) of the same colonial army in a totally different setting, like the East.

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